Summary: The Rassemblement universel pour la Paix, a coalition of antiwar organisations in Britain and France that momentarily engendered hope that war could be effectively opposed, represented a unique opportunity for pacifists on both sides of the Channel to unite in the cause of peace. However, fundamentally different points of departure, definitions of pacifism and domestic political considerations undermined the cohesion of this movement, leaving many of its adherents pessimistic about the utility of such broad-based cooperation. Nevertheless, while ultimately unable to prevent war in 1939, the RUP did represent a transitional moment in interwar pacifism, one in which a greater emphasis was placed on grassroots activism and ecumenical appeal. The “pacifism ancient style” dominated by academics devoted to the League of Nations as an international arbiter (without any real weapons at its disposal) would never enjoy the same support again.

Keywords: pacifism, interwar, Britain, France, rassemblement

In the spring of 2004, the centenary of the Entente Cordiale was marked on both sides of the Channel. The occasion was not without sharp exchanges or irony. Typical of the
mood was the *Guardian*, which opined: “It is important not to sentimentalise the Entente Cordiale of 1904 between Britain and France. The treaty [...] neither abolished all argument between the two nations nor inaugurated an era of perpetual cross-Channel harmony.”

The less than breathless enthusiasm that characterized the commemoration of the pact typified relations between the two signatories at many moments after 1904 also.

The complexity of Anglo-French relations was perhaps most evident in the inter-war period. From Versailles to Vichy, these relations consisted of one misunderstanding after another, a perpetual “*mésentente cordiale*” of sorts. This state of affairs persisted despite an often genuine desire to work collaboratively, especially in the last years of peace. In this regard, the moment that was the *Rassemblement universel pour la Paix* (RUP) or International Peace Campaign is highly significant. The RUP represented the high-water mark of hope amongst many opponents of war in the interwar period. It offered a unique opportunity to forge a powerful coalition across national and sectional lines. Sadly, that opportunity was squandered. The failure of the RUP underlined the seriousness of the obstacles it faced. Beginning from different points of departure, dealing with dissimilar political conditions in which to operate, and buffeted by the winds of contemporary international events at home and abroad, the Anglo-French alliance at the heart of the *Rassemblement* failed to hold.

Some excellent analyses of French and British pacifism in the interwar period have been produced. However, there have been fewer attempts to compare pacifism in the two countries. This reflects an unfortunate historiographical gap, particularly in the context of the RUP. Clearly, definitions and expectations played a major role in the lack of unity that hampered the organization’s efforts.

A deliberate choice has been made here to use the French name – the *Rassemblement universel pour la Paix* – to designate this anti-war organisation. It is telling that, even regarding the name of their organization, British and French participants did not share a common conception of their objectives. The English use of the word “campaign” suggests a limited if practical aim – the coming together of international forces for a specific purpose – while the French word “rassemblement” implies a gathering that extends beyond immediate goals to something more permanent. Meanwhile, the “universel” in the French designation suggests that there was a shared abstract goal – the building of peace – that transcended petty differences of political climate or approach.

The coalition between British and French opponents of war was further complicated by divergent conceptions of the battle. British and French notions of pacifism at the time differed significantly. As Martin Ceadel has observed, analysis of British pacifism “has been handicapped by the narrowing since the mid-1930s of the word ‘pacifism’ in the English speaking world at least, to mean unconditional refusal to support war. [...] In consequence, no word exists to describe that *majority* of the peace movement which has always been pacific but not pacifist” (Ceadel, 1987b: 4). Meanwhile, the French continued to apply the term “pacifism” more liberally, to encompass both those whose opposition to war was absolute and those whose rejection of war was conditional.

In fact, the breadth of the French definition has prompted some observers to correct retroactively a perceived misunderstanding. One recent observer has differentiated between pacifism and what he has called “war anxiety”. He suggested that “It is widely
held that French opinion was, if not pacifist, certainly infused with an anxiety regarding the prospect of war. However, clearly differentiating between pacifism and a more widespread anxiety regarding the ‘next’ war could lead to a more accurate understanding of the public’s apprehensions regarding the prospect of war.” (Hucker, 2007: 434). Whatever the terminology one employs, it is indisputable that British and French definitions of pacifism differed markedly. This had profound implications for an organization like the RUP, whose purpose was to forge a cohesive coalition between various anti-war groups in the two states.

The RUP was intended as an umbrella organization for the various anti-war groups active in Britain and France in the mid 1930s. There have always been suggestions that the organization was a “front” used by Communists and fellow travellers to win credibility among French citizens who opposed the drift to war. Even at its zenith, the RUP confronted this charge. However, to view the RUP as nothing more than a front for the PCF is to miss the full range of motives that inspired members and to underestimate the potential good that such a coalition might have achieved. While there is no doubt that the RUP was, in significant measure, a “reaction to the rise of fascism”, it is equally clear that this movement, more than 400,000 strong around the world, “set itself the goal of uniting all the forces for peace around the League of Nations” (Mazuy, 1993: 40).

The RUP’s rise to prominence represented a unique opportunity for pacifists of all stripes, but particularly for those dedicated to the League of Nations. In the French context, it offered momentary hope that a more united “peace movement” could be fashioned. Traditionally, French pacifism had been badly split, with veterans, internationalists, religious pacifists and socialists all unable to reach out to other constituencies. On the French Left, there had been friction since 1918 between the anti-fascism of the Communists on one hand and the warring factions of pragmatism and integral pacifism evident in the Socialist camp.

In Britain, the RUP could trace its roots back to the League of Nations Union (LNU), which was created in October 1918 (Ceadel, 1987a: 76, 78). As confidence in the League increased in the 1920s, the LNU became the largest of all British organizations devoted to the cause of peace. Its solid financial backing, its moderate stance of peace guaranteed by the League, and its leadership - embodied by the former Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs, Lord Robert Cecil - combined to make the LNU the respectable option for those wishing to register their opposition to war but anxious to avoid the perceived excesses of absolutism.

The membership of the LNU was substantial. Beneath the comforting statistics, however, lay real problems. As the debate surrounding collective security heated up, the LNU refused to face the question of coercion in the name of peace. Cecil himself later conceded that “for ten years we practically evaded the problem of sanctions. I remember perfectly [well] doing it myself” (GMP, 14 November 1938). The LNU was also damaged by the failures of the League of Nations in the 1930s. The collapse of the Disarmament Conference and League inaction during the crises in Manchuria and Abyssinia forced a number of internationalists to reconsider their positions. Many - Cecil among them - began to maintain that, for the League to be truly effective, the nettle of sanctions had to be firmly grasped.

Events were to demonstrate that a large portion of the British population concurred. In 1934 the LNU was involved in the organization of the Peace Ballot, an attempt to
assess League support across Britain. Over 500,000 volunteers distributed ballots, and an astonishing 38 per cent of the adult population filled them in. The ballot read as follows:

1. Should Great Britain remain a Member of the League of Nations?
2. Are you in favour of all-round reduction of armaments by international agreement?
3. Are you in favour of an all-round abolition of national military and naval aircraft by international agreement?
4. Should the manufacture and sale of armaments for private profit be prohibited by international agreement?
5. Do you consider that, if a nation insists on attacking another, the other nations should combine to compel it to stop —
   (a) by economic and non-military measures.
   (b) if necessary, military measures. (Thompson, 1981: 382)

Revealingly, the splitting of the final question so as to separate the two forms of sanction appears to have produced greater support for both. Economic measures were viewed as a reasonable first option and military sanctions were rendered more remote by the emphasis placed on other forms of coercion (Ceadel, 1980a: 833).

In France attitudes were also shifting. The erosion of internationalist influence was illustrated in attempts to rationalize support for their organizations. One 1936 memo proposing allocation of funds is very enlightening:

Table 1: French Government Support for Internationalist Organisations (in French francs)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organisation</th>
<th>Initial Allocation</th>
<th>Revised Allocation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fédération des associations pour la SDN</td>
<td>67,500</td>
<td>61,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Association française pour la SDN</td>
<td>42,000</td>
<td>32,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comité d’action pour la SDN</td>
<td>59,000</td>
<td>50,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Groupement universitaire pour la SDN</td>
<td>42,000</td>
<td>27,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comité français de coopération européenne</td>
<td>37,000</td>
<td>27,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comité français de coopération intellectuelle</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>16,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union féminine pour la SDN</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>1,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Association de la Paix par le Droit</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>14,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Office de propagande graphique pour la paix</td>
<td>8,500</td>
<td>-----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>300,000</td>
<td>230,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The memo from which these statistics are drawn (AAE, 29 janvier 1926) highlights not only the depth of the cuts endured by internationalist organizations, but also the Balkanization of French pacifism at this time. As the table demonstrates, a dizzying number of French organizations were essentially performing the same function. A coalition like the RUP was exactly what was required to give new impetus to the anti-war efforts of internationalists.

Still, government dissatisfaction was not confined to concern over duplication of effort; it was also evident in assessments of internationalist efficacy. The internationalists’ activities were said to consist “essentially of the organization of conferences as well as the publication of tracts, brochures and notices. [...] It is worth underlining that (these efforts) address themselves to a public that is restricted enough, hardly varied and
generally convinced in advance” (AAE, 29 janvier 1926: 4). In the cold light of the League’s recent failures, politicians found it hard to justify expenditures on internationalist groups, whose functionaries often appeared to hold prestige posts in numerous movements simultaneously and whose approach appeared increasingly outmoded.\textsuperscript{7}

The RUP was born into this world of organizations resembling declining fiefdoms. In the spring of 1936, the Radical Party deputy, Pierre Cot, and Robert Cecil were named joint Presidents of the movement (Cecil, 1941: 284; Cot, 1944: 36). From its inception, the RUP was envisioned as a vast coordinating federation seeking to educate the public, harmonize activity on behalf of the League and propagate the Four Points, to which all members adhered. These points were:

1) Recognition of the sanctity of Treaty obligations;
2) Reduction and limitation of armaments by international agreement and suppression of profit from the manufacture of armaments;
3) Strengthening of the League of Nations for the prevention and stopping of war by the more effective organization of Collective Security and Mutual Assistance;
4) Establishment within the framework of the League of Nations of effective machinery for the remediing by peaceful means of international conditions that might lead to wars. (RUP, (1936): 8)

The Japanese invasion of Manchuria, the collapse of the Disarmament Conference, the rise of Hitler, the attack on Abyssinia and the remilitarization of the Rhineland, all were shocking events for those committed to pacifism. The net effect was to move a considerable portion of anti-war activists in the direction of collective security and the League.

The RUP quickly gained an impressive list of adherents. By the spring of 1936, the international bureau included the Labour MP, Philip Noel-Baker, Léon Jouhaux of the Confédération générale du travail and Henri Pichot, president of the Union fédérale des anciens combattants, among others.\textsuperscript{8} In the following months, plans were made for an international conference bringing together the diverse elements of pacific thought across Europe. After some debate, Brussels was selected as the location and the dates of 3-6 September 1936 were chosen. One of the guiding principles of the executive was that the biggest show of unity possible would be made. But this was not as simple as it seemed on the surface. This was clearly demonstrated in the minutes of a meeting at which the RUP founders discussed the Four Points. It was decided that “their acceptance should certainly not be considered as a \textit{sine qua non} for participation in the congress”; nevertheless, it was also agreed that, “it is especially important that no discussion [i.e. debate] of these principles take place at the congress” (RUP, 27 avril 1936). The RUP leadership was struggling to balance inclusivity with consistency of approach, which would have grave implications in the future. Nevertheless, optimism reigned in the wake of the movement’s launch. In October 1936, Jules Jézéquel, International Secretary for the World Alliance for International Friendship through the Churches, typified this outlook when he claimed: “It is today permissible to believe for good reasons in the triumph of pacifism, it being understood that \textit{one means by this word prudent and well thought out action}, the methodical construction of a Society of peoples where [...] force is placed at the disposition of Justice.” (RUP, (1938b))

Jézéquel’s statement also reflected the new vision of internationalism that pervaded RUP thinking. A higher place was given to the use of force. It was still to be employed in the service of justice and was still to take the form of economic before military sanction,
but military intervention was contemplated. The other important innovation was the new emphasis on individual education and action. Formerly, internationalism had been the preserve of academics. Now, even if they did not control the movement, the people were to be counted on to lend it strength through grassroots activism. This shift is significant. One of the central tenets of Norman Ingram’s *The Politics of Dissent* is that a major change in French pacifism did take place between the wars. He differentiates between *pacifisme ancien style*, which tended to be moderate, internationalist and dominated by elites, and *pacifisme nouveau style*, which was more radical, often stressed ethical rather than political considerations and focused more on individual action (Ingram, 1991: 14–15). The RUP appears to have been a transitional movement. It still focused on the League as the best guarantor of peace but sought to reach out to individuals and organizations across traditional fault lines.

This sort of inclusivity, while attracting increasing numbers of average citizens, also proved a constant source of difficulty. Even before the inaugural conference in 1936, there was trouble. In April, modifications to the minutes of the previous meeting of the international bureau proved necessary. The World Alliance for Friendship through the Churches informed the RUP that, although its French section had adhered to the campaign, the international committee had yet to do so. The committee added that it was imperative that “all opinions be represented equally at the congress and not only those of the Left” (RUP, 27-28 avril 1936: 1). Even as the inaugural Congress was opened, tensions still brewed beneath the surface. In his address to the assembled delegates, Pierre Cot underlined the universality of their enterprise but then took to task those who saw their role as limited to “denying war or refusing to fight” and asserted that the success of [the] movement lay in action, which was only possible given “positive organization” (RUP, 1936: 42). Clearly, even at its birth, the RUP was not unified; at its margins, the militant antifascists in particular presented serious challenges, especially as the fascist threat became more menacing.

In spite of this, the RUP remained preoccupied with organization and ecumenical appeal. One of the results of these preoccupations was attention devoted to specific social groups. Specialized commissions were established at Brussels, including committees on Agriculture, Churches, Veterans, Sports, Trade Unions, Women and Youth. While this demonstrated an admirable desire to hear multiple voices, it also laid bare conflicting views on how to ensure peace. For example, one resolution of the ex-servicemen’s commission declared: “The organization of collective security and of mutual assistance is recognized as the most efficient means of preventing war”; the veterans claimed that “the machinery of collective moral, economic, financial and military intervention must be determined beforehand in order to assure its immediate application” (RUP, 1936: 83). In contrast, the prime concern of the Education Commission was the availability of an education “which will be favourable to developing the spirit of peace among children and young people”. This education included a prohibition against the use of schools for “military displays and the abolition of the school organization for military training” and also featured greater emphasis on the propaganda of “non-political peace organizations” (RUP, 1936: 126-7). Was prophylactic education a superior method to collective security? The RUP never ruled on these questions, to its ultimate disadvantage.

One of the key outcomes of the first congress of the RUP was the launching of a number of popular campaigns designed to promote peace. Indeed, the use of innovative methods
of mass mobilization is often cited as one of the RUP’s greatest achievements (Offenstadt and Olivera, 1993: 54). A prime example of this was the plan to erect a Peace Pavilion at the Universal Exposition of 1937 in Paris. RUP leaders saw the construction of a peace pavilion as an opportunity to educate the public regarding its function and the work of the League of Nations. It was hoped that this would both revitalize faith in the League among the world’s smaller nations and spark new interest in the United States (RUP, (1937a): 3) It was not the RUP leadership alone, however, who waxed enthusiastic over the Exposition. The Popular Front government of Léon Blum saw it as an opportunity to underscore the prosperity, the dedication to social justice and the attachment to peace that were taken to be the hallmarks of the new France. An article in the Catholic journal, L’Éveil des Peuples, contended that, “This pavilion will be a cultural centre of worldwide importance from which will shine forth, like a dazzling light, the force and light of progress toward World Peace” (Schweitzer, 1936).

The Blum government allocated 500,000 francs to the pavilion’s construction on the Trocadéro (AN, 8 avril 1936). Organizers hoped that the visitor would leave the pavilion aware of the full terror of modern war but hopeful that a properly supported League of Nations could prevent its reappearance. Among the pavilion’s highlights was a great clock showing “the human lives and economic and social values destroyed every minute during the Great War”, and a photo montage depicting Spanish countryside before and after the Civil War. The most dramatic display was a centrally located bomb which illuminated photographs of horribly mutilated children as it “exploded” (RUP, 5 July 1937, RUP, 11 August 1937 and AN, 26 janvier 1937).

The RUP did all within its power to ensure that a visit to the exposition was made less difficult for the average family - again a sign of enhanced concern for the common person in the battle for peace. The Exhibition Card, which cost 20 francs, or four shillings, entitled the holder to reductions on air and sea routes to France, a 50 per cent reduction on the SNCF, ten half-price entries to the exhibition, reductions on admission to museums and discounts at selected restaurants (RUP, (1937c)). These measures helped ensure the Pavilion’s success. Receipts in excess of 900,000 francs were recorded by the RUP, and thousands of visitors received the message of peace through a revitalized League preached by the movement. On 25 November the exhibit closed, after which it was sent on a successful tour of France (RUP, (1937b)).

The developing situation in Manchuria provided the first opportunity to exploit the success of the Exhibition, and to generate greater support for the movement. Meeting in London in December 1937, the RUP Executive Committee issued a declaration urging
the governments of the “peace loving powers” to “put an end to Japanese aggression on China by economic measures, in particular by excluding from their territory all Japanese goods” (RUP, 15–16 décembre 1937). By the following spring there was cause for optimism. In the US, Woolworth’s stopped carrying Japanese products, as did all retail outlets in Montreal, Quebec. Meanwhile, exports of Japanese silk had fallen precipitously and, overall, a six per cent drop in Japanese exports had taken place (RUP, 25 March 1938 and IPC, (1938c): 8)

A refusal by London financiers to extend further credit would weaken the Japanese position. The report went on to stress that Japan was “almost completely dependent” upon imports. It was heavily reliant on foreign oil, producing only 10 per cent of its home demand, and 60 per cent of its imports came from the United States alone. In sum, as the report’s author put it: “A review of Japan’s economic position discloses […] that no country in the world is more vulnerable […] to economic pressure from a distance, or more conscious of her own complete dependence upon the outside world.” Sadly, the RUP was not able to persuade governments to exploit this vulnerability (RUP, (1938c): 1–3).

If the moderate success of the campaign to boycott Japanese goods underscored some of the strengths of the RUP, then the movement’s difficulties with respect to the Spanish Civil War revealed its most serious weaknesses. It is hardly surprising that it was on the issue of Spain - which bitterly divided the people of France - that RUP unity was permanently shattered. In Spain, the rassemblement faced a situation in which the use of force appeared unavoidable. Awkward conversations that had long been avoided could no longer be delayed.

Typical of the RUP’s early response to the Spanish situation was a resolution issued by the Executive Committee, which deplored “the fact that the withholding of this issue from the League in favour of the Non-Intervention Commission has had the effect of preventing the application of the Covenant” (RUP, 10–11 July 1937: 23). It was not so much the League that was at fault as the governments of member states who refused to let it examine the problem and take the necessary measures. As the outlook for the Republicans grew worse, the RUP spoke more strenuously in favour of action. On 7 May 1938, the Executive Committee declared that it “recalls that a legal government which is defending the national independence of its country, should not be prohibited from procuring for itself in conformity with international law, the arms necessary for its

Despite these achievements, by 1938, the RUP sought an even more coordinated effort. Economic experts within the movement produced a document analyzing the feasibility of concerted economic sanctions against Japan. Many factors pointed to success. Japan had run a trade deficit during the first half of 1937.

Figure 2: Marchers supporting the boycott of Japanese goods sponsored by the RUP (BG A42/472, International Institute of Social History, Amsterdam).

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Mésentente Cordiale: Anglo-French Collaboration in the Rassemblement universel pour la Paix
defence against an open act of aggression” (RUP, 7 mai 1938). This reminder that the Republicans were the elected representatives of the people came as the democracies were re-establishing economic links with Franco.

RUP preoccupation with the Spanish question reached its peak in the summer of 1938. On 23 June a circular was issued announcing plans for a World Conference “Against the Bombardment of Open Towns and for Action for Peace”. The agenda for the gathering was: “1) proposals to end bombardment; 2) better organization of relief to Spain; 3) action for peace within the framework of the Covenant.” The RUP secretariat gave its formal assurance that the conference would confine its work strictly to the above activities without raising political issues and weakening the common effort (RUP, 23 June 1938: 1-2, [emphasis added]). This stipulation might seem bizarre given that peace was the political issue par excellence, and the Spanish Civil War the most controversial contemporary manifestation of the war and peace debate. However, the RUP’s founding myth, which underlined its apolitical stance, was powerful, and suspicion ran deep that the Extreme Left was using the war in Spain to pitchfork the democracies into an antifascist crusade.10

As the conference approached, anxiety over the possibility of political differences dominating proceedings increased. It prompted clear instructions from the RUP’s leadership. Delegates wishing to speak were asked to address their requests to the conference bureau in writing, and all interventions were to be limited to five minutes (RUP, (1938a): 4). Those on the Left who were particularly devoted to the Republican cause were outraged. For example, l’Œuvre included an article, written by one of the Spanish delegates, which declared that a “responsibility more serious than those of the aggressors” lay on the conscience of “States, Governments and International institutions which do not act as morality and the law dictate” (Domingo, 1938: 1 and 4).

The mounting tension between factions within the RUP finally came to a head during the conference. As one witness described it, the audience, “directed and infiltrated by the Communists”, insisted that the Spaniard, La Pasionaria, be given the floor. When those presiding refused, the crowd became unruly, necessitating a half hour delay in proceedings (AN, 1er août 1938). Despite the fact that the incident was not widely reported, the spectacle of a fracas at a pacifist gathering was highly embarrassing. It also prompted deep bitterness. Writing well after the demise of the movement, Cecil questioned the wisdom of ever having cooperated with the Left, writing: “experience of what some Communists and their friends think fair and loyal has led me to the conviction that any political cooperation with them, even for peace, is exceedingly difficult and may even be dangerous” (Cecil, 1941: 285).

The 1938 conference made it plain that the uneasy coalition that was the RUP was splitting apart. When war finally did break out, the RUP maintained operations in some states, notably Britain, China and Sweden. However, its real power on the international stage had disappeared before the beginning of the fighting, when the people lost confidence in the League of Nations as a tool for peace. Was the collapse of the Rassemblement inevitable? This is difficult to determine. Certainly, the RUP had a number of factors working against it from the beginning. The wide spectrum of approaches - from militant antifascism on the one hand to League-based internationalism on the other - meant that the issue of sanctions was not fully addressed until it was too late. When the matter came to a head in relation to Manchuria and Spain, there was no common accord. In addition, the significant influence of French members of the coalition meant that the
same factionalism that afflicted French politics - and caused the downfall of its own Popular Front government - weakened the RUP. In the final analysis, the mésentente cordiale among British and French proponents of peace left the movement unable to address either the contradictions in its doctrine or both countries’ sectional tensions that undermined the rassemblement’s cohesion and strength.

But is this the last word to be said about the RUP? Even if the movement was, ultimately, a failure, it nonetheless represented an important moment in interwar pacifism in Britain and France. In Britain, it epitomized the mass mobilisation that was taking place regarding the issue of war and peace, a mobilisation embodied in initiatives such as the Peace Ballot and Peace Pledge Union. In France it represented a unique opportunity for cooperation on the Left, French Communists and Socialists momentarily forgetting old enmities in the name of hatred of war. In both countries (but particularly in France) the RUP gave stronger voice to constituencies that had not been privileged previously in the war and peace debate; educators, veterans and women found that their opinions were solicited and their solutions received with genuine interest. Finally, on both sides of the channel, the RUP revealed a willingness to try new methods designed to win support at the grassroots level. The Peace Pavilion at the International Exposition of 1937, the proposed boycott of Japanese products and the annual journées de paix organized in the last years of peace in France, all demonstrated a willingness to innovate in the name of peace. While it is true that the RUP may have remained at heart a coalition of notables (Mazuy, 1993: 44), it is equally true that it opened up new avenues of activism to ordinary people. These factors mark the RUP as a significant transitional movement in a period that saw an evolution from an old elitist method to a new populist method of preserving peace.

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Mésentente Cordiale: Anglo-French Collaboration in the Rassemblement universel pour la Paix


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Notes


3 See Peter Farrugia (1991, especially pp. 24-44) for one attempt at comparative analysis. Also useful is Maurice Vaïsse (ed.) (1993).

4 This is one of the theories that Rachel Mazuy explores in her article “Le Rassemblement universel pour la Paix: une organisation de masse?” in Matériaux pour l’Histoire de Notre Temps, vol. 30, no.1 (1993), 40-44. She concludes that, while the PCF benefitted from its work with organisations like the RUP, the movement was never a mere front (41-2).

5 See, for example, Maurice Weber and Robert Jospin, ‘Rapport sur les partis politiques, le Front populaire et la paix’, Le Barrage 87 (5 mars 1936): 5-6, and 88 (12 mars 1936): 4, in which, to quote Ingram, the authors warned colleagues to “stay away from the Rassemblement universel pour la paix” (Ingram, 1991: 201).

6 These last two socialist tendencies were embodied in no less than the two most influential men in the Section Française de l’Internationale Ouvrière, Léon Blum and Paul Faure respectively, whose trajectories after the outbreak of war in 1939 further diverged.

7 Offenstadt and Olivera note that the situation in interwar France was such that certain individuals “ended up virtually becoming professional pacifists” (Offenstadt and Olivera, 1993: 54).


9 Rachel Mazuy has suggested that Blum embodied the pacifisme de fermeté popular in some quarters among French socialists (see Mazuy, 1993: 42).

10 Offenstadt and Olivera (1993: 56) lays out the pitfalls of the RUP’s founding myth in some quarters among French socialists (see Mazuy, 1993: 42).

11 Offenstadt and Olivera (1993) suggest that this democratization was a direct response to the threat to democracy engendered by fascism (see p. 56).